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Executive Summary 
 
This report presents the findings and key policy recommendations of a combined supply chain 
mapping exercise and Brexit exposure check of the transport manufacturing sector in the Midlands, 
funded by the West Midlands Combined Authority.  
These sectors consisted of automotive, rail and aerospace manufacturers and suppliers, for which 
234 firms were surveyed between November 2019 and January 2020. Of these, 25 were exclusively 
involved in aerospace manufacture; 59 were exclusively involved in automotive manufacture; 3 were 
exclusively involved in non-auto road vehicles; 32 were exclusively involved in rail manufacture; 27 
were mixed manufacturers and; 87 were freight/logistics firms. 
Key aspects examined in the mapping exercise included: value of automotive businesses in the West 
Midlands split by vehicle company clients and local authorities; divisions between tiers one and two, 
and logistics and suppliers, employment mix (UK/EU), major challenges faced by supply chain e.g. 
transport infrastructure and paperwork; import/export ratios, transport route dependency, and 
‘Brexit readiness’. 
Our findings suggest that the auto, rail and aerospace supply chains in the West Midlands are 
‘increasingly fragile’ given their exposure to logistics dependency on the Channel Tunnel and ports in 
the South-East of the UK. In particular, we find that transport manufacturing firms and their 
suppliers: 
 are particularly exposed to the operations of Jaguar Land Rover, given its dominance in the 
region 
 have significant exposure to other manufacturers, including Honda - who have already 
announced their intention to close down their Swindon plant by 2021 
 have a high dependency on EU workers, with EU nationals accounting for an average 31% 
of the workforce  
 have a high dependency on the Channel Tunnel, with 17% of exporters and 14% of 
importers exclusively using the Chunnel 
 have a high use on the ports of Liverpool, Southampton, Immingham and Felixstowe, 
placing additional pressure on regional transport networks in the event of a hard Brexit 
The exposure of the regional supply chain to JLR is critical, given that in contrast to other UK-based 
manufacturers, who focus on assembly, JLR conducts substantial R&D operations and value-added in 
the UK. This, added to the logistics constraints faced by a sector operating in a land-locked region, 
poses particular challenges for policymakers going forward. 
Recommendations 
In the event of a hard Brexit, there are important ramifications in terms of the UK’s domestic 
transport architecture, with the A14, the A34, M3 and M1 likely to come under particular pressure in 
the event of traffic being routed away from the Dover-Calais strait, raising issues around 
infrastructure capacity and spend. At a national level, the UK Government should consider: 
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 Boosting regional investment support schemes – this could be in the form of an extended or 
wider Regional Growth Fund (RGF) with preference given to companies which also 
committed to the use of domestic suppliers. 
 Vehicle scrappage schemes to boost demand – these were seen as successful in boosting 
short term demand in the aftermath of the 2008-09 global financial crisis, keeping factories 
busy, but over the longer term simply brought forward demand, leading to reduced sales in 
the future.1 
 Short-time working support – something which the German government is considering 
implementing now, having done so back in 2008 as well.  Several other countries also 
followed this route and helped vehicle companies and their suppliers with support for wages 
of workers on short time working.2  
 Refunding tariffs levied on UK exports to (for example) the EU – in South Africa a very 
complex system exists to eliminate the tariff impact on exports of vehicle produced there. 
 Writing-off of government loans, if made (as the US did in 2008 with GM and Chrysler). 
 Preferential loans, commitment to covering operating losses for a specific period (again as 
done in the US in 2008). 
 Bailouts to prevent financial collapse, along the lines of the support given to Chrysler and GM 
by the US government in 2008-09. 
 Taking equity stakes in manufacturers (e.g. the French government took a stake in PSA when 
it was in financial trouble, alongside its existing stake in Renault); this may be difficult in the 
UK given the overseas ownership of all major vehicle producers. 
While the majority of policy action options open to support existing manufacturing will depend on UK 
Government policy and funding, there are some policy actions which local/regional government 
bodies can consider/enact around business, people and place. For automotive (the largest sector in 
this study): 
 Potential business tax/rates holidays – business rates are widely seen as a disproportionate 
cost burden borne by UK manufacturing companies especially when comparted to equivalent 
taxes levied in continental Europe. Such support was pivotal in the wake of the global 
financial crisis. 
 Training funding to help companies retrain and reskill workers for the transition to EV 
production and other production throughout the supply chain.  
 Offer a loan fund for the supply chain to support otherwise viable firms find new markets. 
This was used in the case of the Rover Task Force and also in the wake of the global financial 
crisis. 
                                                          
1 https://www.smmt.co.uk/2009/10/the-uk-scrappage-incentive-scheme-the-facts/ - this provides an 
indication of the short term impact, boosting output in 2009 by the UK plants of Nissan and Honda especially; 
this report – https://www.ft.com/content/49ea03b6-988f-11de-807a-00144feabdc0 – highlighted the short 
term nature of the scrappage scheme in Germany in terms of boosting manufacturing. 
2 https://www.theguardian.com/business/2009/apr/16/european-short-time-working-unemployment  
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 Provide diversification support for firms in the industry. This was significant and important in 
both the MG Rover collapse3 and in the wake of the global financial crisis4, in the latter case 
through the Automotive Response Programme. 
 Invest in expanding the on-road/car park EV charging infrastructure – this could be a major 
job creation policy as well as expanding the skill base in electrical workers. 
 Establish an industry support taskforce – taskforces were set up around the Rover and LDV 
closures and also in the wake of the global financial crisis at a regional level. More recently, 
Swindon Borough Council and related bodies set up a taskforce in the aftermath of the 
announcement of the Honda factory closure – that said, WMCA needs to be careful that such 
a taskforce has a clear remit and resources to see this through.  
 Consider local procurement strategies, in line with the UK’s commitments under international 
agreements. 
 Establish special enterprise zones with excellent connectivity and a range of tax incentives. 
These should be centred on existing areas of automotive specialisation, building on existing 
clusters of expertise and support the growth of cutting-edge technologies in the region. 
Incubation of scale-up firms is another important area of focus. 
 Look to win the setting up of a battery “gigafactory” to underpin battery production in the 
UK. 
 Support the installation of an Arrival CV factory:5 Hyundai and Kia have recently announced a 
£100m investment in this new UK EV van company.  The company claims its manufacturing 
system is based on small volume micro-factories and would therefore seem to be a 
potentially quick win for new investment. 
For aerospace, moving forwards, it is clear that the details of the UK’s future partnership with the EU 
will be crucial. Tariffs are less significant than for other sectors as the WTO Agreement on Trade in 
Civil Aircraft means that the overwhelming majority of components and final products do not attract 
tariffs. Three issues then are of much greater concern.  Specifically: 
 Potential frictions and delays, particularly in transport 
 Skills shortages, particularly given the challenges raised in relation to a substantial EU 
workforce. 
 Possible regulatory barriers – the sector is keen to ensure that the UK remains under the 
aegis of the European Aviation Safety Agency. 
 
  
                                                          
3 See: Bailey, D and S MacNeill (2008) The Rover Task Force: A Case Study in Proactive and Reactive Policy 
Intervention? Regional Science Policy and Practice. Vol.1, Iss.1, 2008, 1-16. 
4 Bailey, D and N Berkeley (2014) Regional Responses to Recession: A Case Study of the West Midlands, 
Regional Studies, 48(11), 1797-1812. 
5 https://europe.autonews.com/automakers/hyundai-kia-invest-110-million-uk-electric-van-startup-arrival  
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Background and Overview 
 
The aim of this project was to conduct a transport supply chain mapping exercise and quantify 
accurately the dependency of the West Midlands Combined Authority (and proximate) area on the 
automotive, aerospace and rail industry, specifically the business derived from the each sector and 
key OEMs’ manufacturing operations, both in the region and beyond. The current Brexit context 
(and the increased risk of leaving the EU with “no deal” or an otherwise hard Brexit consisting of a 
limited free trade agreement) along with the changing transport sector requirements including a 
drive toward electrification provides a renewed urgency to the undertaking of such an exercise. 
Hence, this research will support WMCA’s (and associated LEPs) work on its West Midlands Local 
Industrial Strategy.  This rightly identifies the West Midlands as the UK’s major centre of transport 
innovation. However, in order for this to continue, companies operating in and around the WMCA 
area must know their exposure to the variety of Brexit scenarios (and other potentially disruptive 
influences) that might unfold. As such, this research provides a more granular analysis to inform 
work in the automotive, transport and logistics, aerospace, rail and related sectors such as low-
carbon technologies and metals and materials identified as “sector strengths” for the region. 
The project: 
a) undertook a detailed supply chain mapping analysis of the transport sector in the WMCA 
(and proximate) areas 
b) and thereby enabled a robust understanding of the transport sector’s supply chain exposure 
to Brexit 
To understand more clearly the importance of the transport sector including automotive, aerospace 
and rail in the West Midlands, it was expedient to consider the overall trends in recent years and the 
impact of major challenges and opportunities in the future. This research sought to identify the 
breadth and depth of the transport supply chain in region and the resilience and impact of major 
factors on the supply chain. 
 As such, the importance of the automotive industry to the UK economy was evident in that 
in 2018, the sector was directly worth £16.9bn to the UK economy and represented over 9% 
of total UK manufacturing6. Indeed, the UK is a major global manufacturer in the automotive 
industry when compared with total world production, being the 12th largest producer of 
automobiles by volume in the world and the 4th largest within Europe, producing over 1.6 
million vehicles, of which 1.52 million were cars7. UK production was equivalent to £53.9bn 
(or 14.7% of total value) in the European industry in 20148. 
 “Other transport” contributed a further £10.6bn. 
o Of this £10.6bn, the overwhelming majority – some £7.6bn – relates to the 
aerospace industry. Repair and maintenance of aircraft and parts was also worth a 
further £2bn to the UK economy in 2016. 
                                                          
6 Office for National Statistics (ONS) (2019), ‘Business Register and Employment Survey’. Accessed on 2nd January 2020 at 
https://www.nomisweb.co.uk/query/construct/summary.asp?mode=construct&version=0&dataset=189  
7 Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders (SMMT) (2019), ‘SMMT Motor Industry Facts 2019’. Accessed on 2nd January 
2020 at: https://www.smmt.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/SMMT-Motor-Industry-Facts-May-2019.pdf  
8 MarketLine (2015), ‘Automotive Manufacturing in the United Kingdom’. MarketLine Industry Profile. London.  
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o Precise figures for the manufacture of trains are not directly comparable, but the 
Annual Business Survey results suggested that the sector was worth some £554 
million in 2016. Manufacture of rails and other parts is likely to be subsumed in the 
manufacture of basic metals and the manufacture of fabricated metals sectors (SIC 
codes 24 and 25). Manufacture of rails is not specifically identifiable from any official 
data source, not least because iron and steel manufacturers specialise in a wide 
variety of production (witness the recent collapse of British Steel). 
 It should be noted that this only measured direct value generated by the industries and thus 
did not capture the whole supply chain - data suggest that in 2016, companies in the 
broader transport sectors bought over £68bn from suppliers in other sectors (the 
automotive industry was the largest, buying £44bn with aerospace next at some £18.5bn). 
This does not include the manufacture of rails and parts for the rail network. 
 These sectors are particularly important in the Midlands. The West Midlands automotive 
industry added £7.1bn of value in 2018 representing 43.3% of the national total and the 
‘other transport’ (mostly aerospace, but including the rail sector) sector added a further 
£0.96bn.  
 For the East Midlands, these sectors were worth a combined £2.1bn and represent almost 
2% of the total regional economy. Again it should be stressed that this does not include any 
other industries in their respective supply chains. 
 In terms of employment, the automotive industry is a major employer in UK manufacturing, 
with 166,000 jobs in the broader motor vehicle manufacturing sector; equivalent to 6.8% of 
total manufacturing industry employment and 0.5% of total UK employment9. In turn, it has 
been argued that the UK workforce itself is a major factor that has promoted the success of 
the industry, in particular the flexibility the UK provides employers to meet changes in 
requirements and environment10.  
 The aerospace sector comprised a further 6,000 and 18,000 jobs in the West and East 
Midlands, whilst the manufacture of trains accounted for 450 and 2500 jobs in the West and 
East Midlands respectively.  Across the Midlands in excess of a further 4000 jobs exist 
maintaining transport equipment (not including shipping or the maintenance and repair of 
motor vehicles). 
 Considering exports, the West Midlands is rather atypical insofar as it has witnessed 
dramatic growth in transport equipment exports to countries outside the EU (primarily road 
vehicles). This is likely to have been driven by a relatively small number of companies 
(exporting mainly to the US and China). 
 In contrast the East Midlands appears much more EU-centric in terms of its exports, 
although it is worth cautioning that for companies with operations in multiple UK regions it 
is possible for exports to be booked from the final assembly plant even if the majority of 
work has been done elsewhere. 
In this context, the decision of the UK to leave the EU has generated a high degree of uncertainly and 
anxiety by UK-based manufacturers. The automotive industry has been particularly vocal in this 
regard, with companies such as Jaguar Land Rover, Toyota and BMW warning of the threats to their 
                                                          
9 Office for National Statistics (ONS) (2019), ‘Business Register and Employment Survey’. Accessed on 2nd January 2020 at 
https://www.nomisweb.co.uk/query/construct/summary.asp?mode=construct&version=0&dataset=189  
10 Automotive Council (2013), ‘Driving success – a strategy for growth and sustainability in the UK automotive sector’. 
Accessed on September 25th 2018 at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/211901/13-975-driving-success-uk-
automotive-strategy-for-growth-and-sustainability.pdf 
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continued viability to manufacture in the UK in the event of a hard Brexit11. One manufacturer in the 
form of Honda, has already announced its intention to cease production at its Swindon plant by 
202112,13. Indeed, there is potential for severe disruption to manufacturing supply chains and 
logistics (in addition to issues around HR and compliance). The automotive sector is particularly 
important to the West Midlands, with the region accounting for almost one third of all UK 
automotive employment and, given that the greater Birmingham area is inland (some 100 miles 
from ports), issues of supply chains, logistics and transporting goods become pivotal with any post-
Brexit disruption. 
However, the EU remains the single largest destination for UK manufactured vehicles, accounting for 
over 50% of UK vehicle exports, with the rest of the world combined accounting for only 30%14. It is 
thus this situation that the prospect of Brexit poses considerable challenges to for an industry 
dominated by Just-in-Time (Lean) production techniques. In the next sections, we provide a more 
detailed depiction of trends in the two main employing sections in the Midlands: automotive and 
aerospace. 
Profile of automotive 
 
The importance of the UK motor industry can be analysed through its economic output, using GVA 
figures. GVA puts a value on goods and services that are produced within a region/ economy, less 
the cost of intermediate consumption.  In 2017, the automotive sector was directly worth £15.2bn 
to the UK economy and represented over 8% of total manufacturing, as depicted in Table 1: 
Table 1 
 
  Current 
Prices 
(£bn) 
Real 
terms 
(£bn) 
% of 
manufacturing 
% of 
UK 
total 
1997 9.4 10.7 6.5 1.1 
1998 9.0 11.2 6.3 1.0 
1999 7.9 11.4 5.6 0.9 
2000 9.4 10.8 6.6 1.0 
2001 8.5 10.2 6.2 0.8 
2002 8.1 11.1 6.0 0.8 
2003 8.1 11.4 6.0 0.7 
2004 7.6 11.5 5.7 0.6 
2005 8.1 11.3 5.8 0.6 
2006 8.1 10.9 5.8 0.6 
                                                          
11 Business Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee (BEIS) (2018), ‘The impact of Brexit on the automotive 
sector’. Fifth Report of the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee Session 2017–19. London. 
12 BBC (2019), ‘Honda confirms Swindon car plant closure’, BBC News, 19th February 2019. Accessed on 2nd 
January 2020 at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-47287386  
13 Although Honda denied Brexit as the deciding factor, citing broader industry trends, discussions of the 
potential impact of Brexit certainly played a part in lead-up conversations. 
14 Bailey, D. and De Propris, L. (2017), ‘Brexit and the UK Automotive Industry’, National Institute Economic 
Review, 242 (1): R51-R59.  
9 
 
2007 7.5 11.4 5.4 0.5 
2008 8.2 10.8 5.7 0.6 
2009 5.9 7.7 4.4 0.4 
2010 8.4 9.2 6.0 0.6 
2011 8.2 10.4 5.6 0.6 
2012 8.6 10.8 5.8 0.6 
2013 11.5 11.7 7.2 0.7 
2014 13.3 12.7 8.2 0.8 
2015 13.5 13.5 8.0 0.8 
2016 14.6 14.2 8.3 0.8 
2017 15.2 14.3 8.1 0.8 
Source: Office for National Statistics 
The UK automotive manufacturing sector experienced steady growth from 2010 to 2016, with recent 
highs in 2016 of almost 25% above its pre-downturn peak. During this time the UK automotive 
industry outpaced the total UK manufacturing growth.  The UK Automotive manufacturing industry 
is dominated by the production of cars, accounting for 94.5% of total production volume (the rest 
being trucks and motorcycles).  It is dominated by five major players, as shown in Table 2, which 
account for almost two-thirds of total production. 
 
Table 2 
 
United Kingdom automotive industry manufacturing share by volume 2017 
 
Jaguar Land Rover Automotive Plc  31.8% 
Nissan Motor Manufacturing (UK) Ltd  29.6% 
BMW UK Manufacturing Ltd  13.1% 
Honda Motor Company Ltd  9.8% 
Toyota Motor Corporation 8.6% 
Other  36.8% 
 
The UK automotive manufacturing industry has become, and is continuing to become more 
integrated within the global economy. 80% of total UK vehicle production was exported in 2017, up 
from 77% in 201515, as shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 
 
                                                          
15 Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders (SMMT) (2019), ‘SMMT Motor Industry Facts 2019’. Accessed on 2nd 
January 2020 at: https://www.smmt.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/SMMT-Motor-Industry-Facts-May-2019.pdf 
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(Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs) 
 
Exports of passenger road vehicles to the EU (almost exclusively motor cars) increased by 133% in 
the 20 years from 1997 to 2017 to a total of £13.3 billion.  Exports to non-EU countries have shown 
rapid growth of over 500% from £3.2 billion to £19.2 billion over the same period. Although both 
imports and exports have seen huge increases over time, the value of total imports has been 
consistently higher than exports. The UK trade deficit in road passenger vehicles reached a recent 
peak of £6.3bn in 2015 (the highest since 2007), although this has since fallen to just £1.7bn last 
year.  The EU accounted for 87% of total UK vehicle imports by value and these have more than 
doubled from £11.3bn in 1997 to £ 29.8bn last year.   
The UK automotive industry relies heavily on its international supply chain in order to add value, 
reduce costs, and provide innovation to final products. Key inputs required by manufacturers are 
typically commodity and pre-fabricated components, often produced by their third-party suppliers16. 
The UK automotive supply chain consists of a wide range of companies, ranging from small 
specialists firms to large multinationals. Research conducted by the Figures from the 
Interdepartmental Business Register (IDBR) indicate that in 2017 a total of 1005 enterprises were 
involved in the manufacture of motor vehicles as their primary activity17.  A further 1,385 businesses 
are primarily classed as manufacturers of parts for motor vehicles17.  However, this is only part of the 
picture; many companies who provide inputs for the automotive industry categorise their business 
in terms of the materials they work with, and many of these suppliers will be further upstream, 
primarily selling to tier 1 supplier rather than the vehicle producers themselves.  UK tier-one 
                                                          
16 MarketLine (2015), ‘Automotive Manufacturing in the United Kingdom’. MarketLine Industry Profile. London. 
17 Office for National Statistics. (2018b). UK Business counts - enterprises by industry and employment size 
band. NOMIS: Official labour market statistics. Available from: NOMIS: Official labour market 
statistics. Retrieved from 
https://www.nomisweb.co.uk/query/select/getdatasetbytheme.asp?opt=3&theme=&subgrp= 
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
£
 b
ill
io
n
s
Trade in the Automotive Sector
Non-EU Exports EU Exports Non-EU Imports EU Imports Balance
11 
 
companies are importing a large proportion of their inputs, including metals, plastics, glass and other 
products that are categorised elsewhere in trade statistics. 
One fruitful official data source available are the input-output tables published by the ONS.  The 
published figures pertain to the “manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers”.  Clearly 
this encompasses a significantly broader range of production than simply the automotive sector.  It 
includes commercial vehicles and all parts used by road vehicles (including engines).  As the detailed 
information necessary for I/O tables takes some time to collect, they are published some way in 
arrears.  Nevertheless, they remain instructive. 
The entire sector used £36bn of inputs in 2014, of which almost exactly half was imported (see 
Figure 2).  Of that portion sourced domestically, by far the largest component (£3.5bn) was services 
provided by the “wholesale and retail trade of motor vehicles, including repair”.  This sector is 
unlikely to be affected by Brexit – even in the most extreme scenarios, automotive companies will 
need to maintain dealer networks in the UK.  Other technological changes (and an increasing desire 
to complete purchases online) are much more likely to reduce this over time. 
 
Figure 2 
 
 
The second and third largest components were other wholesale trade (which includes the wholesale 
of machinery, equipment and supplies) and fabricated metal products (at £2.2bn and £2.1bn 
respectively.  
Components from other companies in the sector were also significant (£1.5bn), but rubber, 
electricity and financial services were also significant suppliers to the sector (at over £1bn apiece).  
Beyond this, a plethora of both manufactured goods (iron and steel, other metals, petrochemicals, 
wood, paints and dyes et al.) and services (computer services, management consultancy and many 
others) are used by the sector.  In short, supply chains are long and complex and heavily weaved into 
areas of the British economy where one might not initially expect them.  From this £36bn of inputs, 
the sector generated a further £13.2bn of value-added, of which over two-thirds was paid out to 
employees in the form of wages. 
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Profile of aerospace  
 
Figure 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The UK’s aerospace industry has been a notable industrial success in recent years, doubling in size 
since the mid-1990s18 as depicted in Figure 3.  Growth has been particularly rapid since the global 
financial crisis, growing by over 50% since 2007, compared to just 14% for the economy as a whole.  
This has rendered it one of the most successful sectors of the UK economy in recent years and a rare 
“good news” story over the past decade.  The closely related sector, “repair and maintenance of 
aircraft” has also grown more rapidly than the UK as a whole and the two now contribute almost 
£10bn to the UK economy18. 
The aerospace industry is significantly more spatially diffuse than some others (e.g. automotive, 
which is clustered in the West Midlands or finance, which is clustered in central London). 
Nevertheless, certain concentrations are notable. In the context of the Midlands, by far the largest 
of these is in Derby, where some 16,000 manufacturing jobs are clustered (out of a total of 26,400 in 
the Midlands)19, many of which are directly related to the presence of Rolls-Royce. 
Elsewhere, a significant number of jobs (approximately 1000 positions) are located in 
Wolverhampton, reflecting the longstanding presence of several companies, including Collins 
Aerospace (formerly UTC), HS Marston and Moog. This cluster extends into Staffordshire (which 
hosts a further 500 jobs), which is unsurprising given the location of the i54 site. Most repair and 
maintenance of aircraft in the West Midlands takes place in Birmingham and Solihull, probably 
reflecting proximity to region’s primary international airport. 
The aerospace sector accounted for 4.3% of the UK’s goods exports in 2018, making it a significant 
exporting industry (Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs, 2018).  It is also an industry in which the UK 
runs a trade surplus. Aerospace trade has grown dramatically in recent years.  Civil aviation is closely 
related to the defence sector with a number of critical components being classified as “dual use”. As 
                                                          
18 Office for National Statistics. (2018a). Second estimate of GDP: October to December 2017. 
19 Office for National Statistics (ONS) (2019), ‘Business Register and Employment Survey’. Accessed on 2nd 
January 2020 at 
https://www.nomisweb.co.uk/query/construct/summary.asp?mode=construct&version=0&dataset=189 
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a result, trade is comparatively heavily regulated.  On the civil side, safety is paramount with 
extremely tight specifications. 
The sector has long been international in nature, although for large players, politics and perceptions 
of national security can play a role as large as (or even larger) commercial imperatives in 
determining locations and trade patterns.  In the British context, the sector is heavily integrated in 
European supply chains with components criss-crossing borders multiple times during the course of 
manufacture.  According to HMRC, exports to the EU increased by around 550% between 1996 and 
2017, whilst imports from the EU increased by some 250% over the same period (Her Majesty's 
Revenue and Customs, 2018). 
This may reflect export of partial assemblies and jet engines as exports to the EU have grown 
substantially more strongly than exports to the rest of the world.  As can be seen, the UK actually 
runs a trade surplus in aircraft and components with the EU accounting for a particularly large 
portion of exports in this trade category. 
 
Figure 4 
 
As aerospace orders are typically extremely “lumpy”, the UK’s largest trade partners can vary 
substantially year to year, as shown in Figure 4. Aside from the EU, the US is also consistently a very 
large trade partner with both a large and sophisticated network of aerospace manufacturers of its 
own and is a huge market for jet engines. 
Within Europe, France and Germany are consistently the UK’s largest trading partners.  A significant 
chunk of this almost certainly reflects the fact that final assembly of many Airbus aircraft occurs in 
France.  Similarly, the fact that over half of Airbus’ annual output of the A320 family of aircraft is 
from Hamburg-Finkenwerder in Germany20 is likely to account for a significant portion of UK 
                                                          
20 Airbus SE. (2018). Airbus in Germany. Retrieved from: http://www.airbus.com/company/worldwide-
presence/germany.html. 
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aerospace exports to that country.  In recent years, imports from Spain and Italy have increased 
dramatically, again probably due to their growing relevance to the aerospace supply chain 
(particularly for Airbus). 
Moreover, the UK sector is concentrated on certain key specialisms, particularly wings, engines and 
fuselages21. 
 
Figure 5 
 
 
As demonstrated above in Figure 5, the aerospace sector has an impact on a wide variety of parts of 
the economy.  Over 40% of all intermediate purchases made by the sector are imports and of these a 
majority relate to specialist components.  According to figures from the Inter-Departmental Business 
Register (IDBR), around 80% of enterprises in the sector employ fewer than 10 people22. 
In general, many of these micro companies provide specific services to much larger firms (often 
outsourced).  Whilst small firms may account for the bulk of enterprises in any given sector, the 
general pattern is for a large proportion of total value to be added by large firms.  In fact, one 
standout feature of the aerospace industry in the UK is the number of very large firms (250+ 
employees). 
                                                          
21 Business Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee. (2018). The impact of Brexit on the aerospace sector. 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmbeis/380/38002.htm 
22 Office for National Statistics. (2018). UK Business counts - enterprises by industry and employment size 
band. NOMIS: Official labour market statistics. Available from: NOMIS: Official labour market 
statistics. Retrieved from 
https://www.nomisweb.co.uk/query/select/getdatasetbytheme.asp?opt=3&theme=&subgrp= 
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The aerospace sector is a critical contributor to R&D in the UK, spending over £1.9bn in 201623.  In 
2016 it made up 8.6% of total business R&D expenditure in the UK behind only pharmaceuticals and 
the automotive industry23.  Moreover, compared to other sectors, a greater proportion of its R&D 
expenditure is “applied” in the sense of having direct commercial application.  Indeed, the aerospace 
sector makes up around one-eighth of applied business R&D.  As such, it is an excellent counter-
example to the claim that the UK fails to commercialise innovation. 
In contrast to the pharmaceutical and automotive sectors, a substantial majority of R&D is 
undertaken by UK-owned enterprises, although it is possible that a significant chunk of this is related 
to defence.  Nevertheless, foreign-owned enterprises committed a substantial £750m to business 
R&D in the sector.  In addition to this, the sector has benefitted significantly from EU R&D funding.  
The UK has secured some 15% of funds thus far available for the transport sector under the EU’s 
Horizon 2020 programme and aerospace alone benefits to the tune of £100m24. 
As with any internationally-facing industry, the aerospace sector relies intensely on its international 
supply chain in order to add value, provide product innovation and ensure rigorous quality 
benchmarks are met.  Key inputs include pre-fabricated components and complex assemblies.  Like 
the automotive and rail sectors, the supply chain consists of a complex array of players from tiny 
specialists to huge transnationals.  Whilst cost is inevitably an important consideration, safety and 
quality benchmarks are overwhelmingly important.  Reducing external noise in order to help airports 
meet stringent limits is another regulatory factor that matters for aerospace in a way that simply 
does not exist in other industries. 
Although the UK remains a major player in the global aerospace industry, with an enviable record of 
productivity growth, skills shortages are a notable concern.  These are particularly concentrated in 
the high-skilled design & engineering and R&D sectors, where around one third of companies are not 
confident they can access specific skills25. 
There is also a notable shortage of production and assembly workers as well as concerns around 
availability of staff specialising in data and analytics. Leaving the EU could make attracting and 
retaining skilled workers from other parts of Europe more challenging, with smaller companies likely 
to face particular issues in recruitment. Intra-company transfers are highly prevalent due to the 
cross-border nature of the aerospace industry. Airbus alone has around 600 EU27 employees 
working in the UK24. 
Skills shortages are presently apparent in certain areas, including composites and damage and 
fatigue tolerance26 (The Aerospace Growth Partnership, 2016). These are likely to grow in coming 
years without a fresh influx of trained and experienced engineers. A substantial proportion of the 
industry’s workforce is over 45 and it is overwhelmingly male (The Aerospace Growth Partnership, 
2016).  Facilitating both graduate and non-graduate entry into the industry and attracting greater 
                                                          
23 Office for National Statistics. (2017b). UK business enterprise research and development. Retrieved from 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/governmentpublicsectorandtaxes/researchanddevelopmentexpen
diture/datasets/ukbusinessenterpriseresearchanddevelopment 
24 Business Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee. (2018). The impact of Brexit on the aerospace sector. 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmbeis/380/38002.htm 
25 ADS Group. (2017). UK Aerospace Outlook Report 2017. https://www.adsgroup.org.uk/facts/uk-aerospace-
outlook-report-2017/ 
26 The Aerospace Growth Partnership. (2016). Means of Ascent: The Aerospace Growth Partnership’s Industrial 
Strategy for UK Aerospace 2016. https://www.theagp.aero/wp-
content/uploads/sites/9/2016/07/Means-of-Acscent-2nd-Edition-LoRes-02-08-16.pdf 
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numbers of women into the field will be crucial in order to alleviate skills shortages in the medium 
term.  Up-skilling and retraining will also prove crucial, particularly to meet more immediate 
challenges (such as the loss of European labour). 
Interestingly, whilst the state of technical education in the UK has long been criticised as lagging 
behind its continental counterparts, the aerospace sector has dramatically increased its provision of 
apprenticeships. Whilst in 2009 only 15% of companies in the sector provided apprenticeships, by 
2015, this had risen to 62%. 
In the sections that follow, we further consider how companies make supply-chain decisions in the 
sector, before turning to recent developments in the sector in the wake of the Brexit vote. We then 
introduce the findings of our own survey research on senior managers in the automotive industry in 
the UK who have some “ownership” of the issues raised by Brexit, before concluding with supply 
chain and wider policy (transport, infrastructure etc.) implications for the sector. 
Understanding the impact on the supply chain: issues for practitioners 
and regional policymakers 
 
Within discussions regarding the status of the UK transport manufacturing sector, and most notably 
the automotive industry, the possible impact of Brexit on supply chains has assumed particular 
urgency for analysis by academics and practitioners alike. For UK manufacturing, the most likely 
impact of Brexit is that costs will increase. This is because the UK Government’s withdrawal 
agreement with the EU only maintains the current status quo ante in a transition period due to 
expire at the end of December 2020 (although there is the option of an extension, if both parties 
agree by the end of June 2020). Given that it is unlikely that any comprehensive new trade 
agreement will be finalised in this time, the distinct prospect emerges of either an abrupt exit from 
the EU Single Market and Customs Union area and reversion to World Trade Organisation third-
country status, or a minimalistic ‘bare-bones’ Canada style deal that just eliminates most tariffs.27  
The costs of a “no deal” exit at the end of 2020 are generally deemed by analysts to be considerable, 
with the National Institute for Economic and Social Research (NIESR), for example, predicting that 
the withdrawal agreement negotiated by the Johnson government would lead to the UK economy 
being 3.5% smaller than it otherwise would have been by staying in the EU, in the long-run28. This 
could occur directly in the form of customs and excise duties.  
For the auto industry, In the event of “no deal” at the end of 2020, a hard Brexit – taken as 10 per 
cent tariffs applied at the port of entry on the landed price of UK-made vehicles when they arrive in 
the EU – would hit EU demand for UK-made vehicles. 
Ian Henry of AutoAnalysis (and Visiting Professor at CBS) forecasts additional costs of at least £3bn 
just in tariffs to UK output and far more when non-tariff barriers are added in: “we calculate that 
1.5m vehicles would be lost from otherwise expected UK production from 2020 through to 2024; 
and, taking into account the different mix of vehicles involved, from Opel Astras through to Rolls 
                                                          
27 Bailey, D, A de Ruyter, N Fowler and J Mair, (2020) eds., ‘Carmageddon? Brexit & Beyond for UK Auto’. Bite-
Size Books. 
28 https://www.niesr.ac.uk/sites/default/files/UK%20Economy%20Press%20Release%20-
NIER%20No250%20November%20-%20Embargoed%20till%2000.01%20Wednesday%2030%20October.pdf 
accessed November 18th 2019. 
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Royces, the loss of economic value at the factory gate would be nearly £43bn, or more than £8bn a 
year on average.29 
“£3bn in additional costs a year and £8bn a year in lost economic value creation are sums which any 
industry would struggle to bear unscathed. Given the global headwinds battering UK vehicle 
production, we can expect further major challenges for this once thriving, but now troubled, sector” 
he says. 
Longer term, in the event of “no deal” at the end of 2020 the loss of models made in the UK could 
see output in the latter part of the next decade being 500,000 units lower per year than in a base-
case scenario of managed deal and orderly Brexit say Justin Cox and David Oakley of LMC 
Automotive. That would take output down to levels not seen since the global financial crisis with a 
big hit to jobs in assembly and the supply chain. 
PSA has already indicated that “no deal” would see no investment at Ellesmere Port to make the 
new Astra model. And while “no deal” would be especially damaging for UK auto, the form of trade 
deal done with the EU will still be critical, as David Bailey (a co-author of this report) has noted 
recently: 
“Whilst ‘No Deal’ is seen by many in industry as highly damaging, even a limited trade deal that 
simply eliminates most tariffs – of the sort envisaged in the latest political declaration – could still 
cause severe headaches for industry given issues of regulatory divergence and through the UK being 
outside the EU Customs Union.” 30 
Beyond the immediate impact of the trading relationship, another potential impact of Brexit could 
be on human resources. EU skilled workers currently working in the UK could return to the EU 
should Freedom of Movement be rescinded – which in turn could exacerbate skills shortages in key 
sectors. In addition, some companies could close down UK branches due to shrinkage of the market, 
or even relocate their plants or/and R&D centre to other (EU) countries. Finally, inbound FDI to the 
UK could also decrease due to the loss of Single Market membership31,32.  
In response to the potential impacts of Brexit, conventional approaches to supporting the supply 
chain have been to emphasise increased resilience. As such, it is argued that enhancing supply chain 
integration could help to build up a higher resilient capability. With information sharing, the 
“bullwhip effect” - defined as the distortion of demand information as one moves upstream in the 
supply chain, causing severe inefficiencies within the whole supply chain33 - could be minimalised 
and companies would be able to make proper responses to different situations with enough 
evidence as support. In addition to integration, it has been argued that the implementation of lean 
                                                          
29 Bailey, D, A de Ruyter, N Fowler and J Mair, (2020) ed.s, Carmageddon? Brexit & Beyond for UK Auto. Bite-
Size Books. 
30 Bailey, D, A de Ruyter, N Fowler and J Mair, (2020) ed.s, Carmageddon? Brexit & Beyond for UK Auto. Bite-
Size Books. 
31 Bailey, D. and De Propris, L. (2017), ‘Brexit and the UK Automotive Industry’, National Institute Economic 
Review, 242 (1): R51-R59. 
32 Dhingra, S., Ottaviano, G., Sampson, T. and Van Reenen, J. (2016), ‘The impact of Brexit on foreign 
investment in the UK’, BREXIT 2016, 24. 
33 Costantino, F., Di Gravio, G., Shaban, A. and Tronci, M. (2013), ‘Exploring the bullwhip effect and inventory 
stability in a seasonal supply chain’, International Journal of Engineering Business Management, 5: 23. 
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principles of production, or supply chain segmentation34 could comprise other approaches to 
enhance resilience.  
Alternatively, the additional costs arising from Brexit could result in supplier re-evaluation as firms 
seek to optimise existing supply chains and hence prepare for the supplier “earthquake” that could 
be brought about by Brexit. When re-evaluating current suppliers, the total cost of ownership (TCO) 
could be one framework to help companies in choosing between suppliers. Some suppliers might be 
able to provide a lower price. However, if they are far away from the UK, then lengthy 
transportation times and low flexibility of changes could result in additional costs. Therefore, local 
suppliers might be able to provide a cheaper total cost to OEMs, even if their costs of production are 
higher. As such, a TCO approach might result in companies seeking to “re-shore” operations to the 
UK in the event of a hard Brexit35.  
Finally, new technology development and implementation could be another approach whereby 
companies could build up a long-term sustainable and stable supply chain which would be less 
exposed to an unfavourable external environment. For example, 3D printing technology, a feature of 
“Industry 4.0”, could provide an innovative approach to production - which has been widely used in 
aerospace industry36. 3D printing could also help to enhance the vertical integration of production, 
as a result, the tiers of suppliers could be reduced37. Hence, supply chains could become simpler and 
thus enhancing the capability to against urgent change of external environment. 
However, none of these potential business responses takes place in a spatial vacuum and the 
logistics implications of any particular supply chain response are considerable – both for the 
businesses affected, and for policy makers concerned with the wider ramifications for the ability of 
regional infrastructure to cope with any alteration to the operations and logistics of firms responding 
to any Brexit shocks. The responses described above could entail changes in the route of transport 
or mode of transport – or both, depending on the situation facing any particular business. Small-
scale niche producers such as Aston Martin in the Midlands, for example, have stated that they 
would look to airfreight in parts and components in order to overcome any disruptions at ports and 
the Eurotunnel38. However, even if they did this, this could only be a short term solution as it would 
be uneconomic as a long-term policy. 
As such, for landlocked regions such as the West Midlands, these concerns take on particular 
saliency for planners and policymakers, as disruptions arising elsewhere (namely the south-east of 
England) could have cumulatively negative knock-on effects as firms operating in the region have to 
contend with congested transport routes that pass around (typically via the M25) heavily-populated 
areas such as London. For regional planners then, connectivity (both in the physical and digital 
sense) is key; and any Brexit disruption might well incur a cost in terms of the need to upgrade 
                                                          
34 Safonovs, R. and Upadhyay, A. (2017), ‘Is your Brexit supply chain resilient enough? The British footwear 
manufacturers’ perspective’, Strategic Direction, 33 (11): 34-36. 
35 Godsell, J., Ignatius, J., Karatzas, A., King, J., Li, D., Moore, J. (2017), ‘Realities of Reshoring: A UK Perspective’. 
Coventry: WMG, University of Warwick. 
36 Joshi, S. and Sheikh, A. (2015), ‘3D printing in aerospace and its long-term sustainability’, Virtual and Physical 
Prototyping, 10 (4): 175-185. 
37 Berman, B. (2012), ‘3-D printing: The new industrial revolution’, Business Horizons, 55 (2): 155-62. 
38 Pitas, C. (2019), ‘Exclusive: Aston Martin triggers contingency plans for no deal Brexit’, Reuters. Accessed on 
2nd January 2020 at: https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-britain-eu-astonmartin-exclusive/exclusive-aston-
martin-triggers-contingency-plans-for-no-deal-brexit-idUKKCN1P114N 
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infrastructure, be it in terms of broadband coverage, or upgrading a major east-west road link such 
as the A5 or the A14. There are in turn implications for regional governance arrangements in terms 
of ensuring that current governance structures enable sufficient place leadership to ensure a rapid, 
coordinated response to any regional shocks. 
That said, in contrast to understanding the exposure to Brexit at the macro-regional level for 
particular sectors (notably, for example, the work of Chen et al.39), there has been virtually no work 
done on having a micro-understanding of the nature of the supply chain and related logistics issues 
for the sector at a regional level. Evidence at a micro-level is partial and fragmentary at best. 
Kerridge40 cites a 2015 Institute for Government study that list lorry movements for most major 
ports in the UK; with the predominance of Dover and the Eurotunnel being all too manifest. 
However, they shed no light on the nature of movements within the UK, or breakdown between 
inward and outward traffic. All too often, it is simply assumed that the sector has made adequate 
preparations for Brexit, and beyond expediting inward traffic through ports no further consideration 
is given to logistics issues. Indeed, it is widely assumed – particularly in UK Government circles that 
companies are preparing for Brexit as part of normal risk management and contingency planning 
exercises.  
However, evident from previous research undertaken by the authors during 201841 is that even the 
large OEMs in the region (e.g., Jaguar Land Rover) lack adequate knowledge of their supply chain, for 
example: 
“We have a very strong understanding of who our suppliers are at Tier 1 and then direct to Tier 2, 
and visibility…. that means we worked with that supplier for the engineering, but we don’t own the 
commercial relationship, it goes through a Tier 1. Beyond that, we don’t really have much knowledge 
of who our suppliers are and where the parts come from, and therefore, we don’t have a working 
group at the moment with our suppliers, it’s every person for themselves”. (Senior Procurement 
Manager, large OEM);  
OR, on the “understanding” of suppliers: 
“Many of them are quite small business with very limited resources, and don’t really think through 
the strategies in in much depth, I mean, they just know that somebody gives them an order and they 
fulfil it… and some of them are very simple businesses and many of them aren’t even on, you know, 
on shore in the UK they...they will be simple businesses all over the world.” (Senior Procurement 
Manager, Tier 1). 
Hence there was a manifest need for a more bespoke, granular analysis so as to enable the analysis 
of vital data that would help guide regional policymakers in terms of logistics issues pertaining to 
ensuring supply chains can mitigate the disruption arising from Brexit. In particular, the research 
sought to understand the exposure of suppliers to any particular individual Original Equipment 
Manufacturer (OEM) in terms of revenue/turnover sources.  
                                                          
39 Chen, W., Los, B., McCann, P., Ortega-Argilés, R., Thissen, M., & van Oort, F. (2018), ‘The continental divide? Economic 
exposure to Brexit in regions and countries on both sides of The Channel’, Papers in Regional Science, 97 (1): 25-54. 
40 Kerridge, M. (2018), ‘The Impact of Brexit on the Transport Industry’, Logistics and Transport, 4 (40): 35-42. 
41 Di Li, Shishank Shishank, Alex de Ruyter, Syed Ali, David Bailey, David Hearne, Sukhwinder Salh and Tom 
Leeson (2019), ‘Brexit and the Auto Industry: understanding the issues for supply chain management’. In De 
Ruyter, A. and Nielsen, B. (eds.) (2019) ‘Article 50 one year on: Evaluating Progress, Process and Impact’. 
Emerald: Bingley 
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Through this an understanding could be gained of the likely effect on turnover and employment for 
suppliers should a particular OEM engage in plant closure or otherwise downscale production at its 
plants. In addition, an understanding of sector logistics (in particular freight movements and mode of 
transport) could assist businesses and policymakers in devising strategies to find alternative 
transport solutions to these problems. Finally, an understanding of related HR and compliance issues 
could assist in the facilitation of more targeted policy approaches there. 
Methods used 
 
Given the focus of the study on the transport manufacturing sector, a quantitative survey 
questionnaire (with some open-ended questions) was conducted. The supply chain mapping analysis 
presented in this article focusses on a dataset of respondents from transport component 
manufacturers and suppliers in automotive, rail and aerospace, who were asked for data on their 
turnover and how this divided between: 
 The automotive, aerospace and rail sectors; 
 Between major car companies, aerospace firms and manufacturers of rolling stock, and; 
 And between local, Midlands customers, customers elsewhere in the UK, and customers in 
the EU and beyond. 
Respondents were obtained via a number of methods, including direct mailings from sector from 
Drive Midlands and the Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders (SMMT) and local chambers of 
commerce, direct canvassing and sourcing of participants at various networking events, direct 
emailing to personal contacts of the authors, and also via the use of a professional survey company, 
who used their network of partners and affiliates to contact sector firms on their databases to 
complete the survey (for which the average time to complete was approximately 10 minutes).  
The survey questionnaire (see Appendix 1 for questionnaire template) specifically sought to assess: 
which of the rail, automotive and aerospace sectors respondents’ firms operated in; the percentage 
turnover attributable to each of automotive, rail and aerospace; and for automotive, which OEMs 
accounted for a given percent of turnover; whether they imported and/or exported goods from the 
EU; what transport routes (e.g., trunk roads) were used in doing so; what ports/airports etc. they 
used for EU trade; and,  a range of “Brexit exposure” questions relating to preparedness in terms of 
customs, VAT, HR, regulatory compliance, logistics and supply chain management issues. The survey 
also provided quite granular data (down to 5-digit SIC equivalent) on the specific industrial area that 
these firms operated in. 
In terms of the profile of respondents, 234 completed responses were received in total. Of these, 25 
were exclusively involved in aerospace manufacture; 59 were exclusively involved in automotive 
manufacture; 3 were exclusively involved in non-auto road vehicles; 32 were exclusively involved in 
rail manufacture; 27 were mixed manufacturers, and; 87 were freight/logistics firms. Of these, a 
majority of freight hauliers either were for aero manufacturers (58) or auto manufacturers. In terms 
of the geographic spread of respondents, this is depicted in Figure 6. Evident is a dominance of 
Birmingham City Council in terms of the number of respondents (though this should not obscure the 
importance of Solihull, or Coventry, Warwickshire or Telford as being the location for key OEMs such 
as Jaguar Land Rover). 
 
  
21 
 
Figure 6: Location of respondents by Local Authority/County 
 
 
A breakdown of firm respondents by perceived position in the supply chain and employment size 
threshold is provided in Tables 3 and 4 below. For the firms in our sample, the average (mean) 
turnover reported was just under £500 million, though this is distorted by the presence of Jaguar 
Land Rover, with its reported turnover of £25bn. Within the sample, 22 firms reported a turnover 
greater than £1m per (estimated) employee, whilst the median turnover reported was £32.5 million. 
For automotive firms, the mean turnover reported (excluding JLR) approximately £170 million. 
Table 3: Manufacturers – position in supply chain 
 
Tier Exclusively auto Exclusively aero Exclusively rail Exclusively other 
road 
Mixed 
OEM * 24 1 14 0 4 
Tier 1 18 5 10 1 10 
Tier 2 12 14 11 1 13 
Tier 3+ 4 4 0 0 3 
Industrial 
service provider 
7 0 0 1 0 
 
Table 4: Manufacturers – size distribution 
Tier Micro (<10 
employees) 
Small (11-50 
employees) 
Medium (51-
250) 
Large 
(251-500) 
V. Large 
(500+) 
OEM * 3 3 10 20 7 
Tier 1 1 10 15 17 1 
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Tier 2 1 6 15 26 3 
Tier 3+ 0 0 5 5 1 
Industrial service 
provider 
1 1 1 2 3 
NB: OEM here is based upon respondents’ self-identification. As such, the term will include Vehicle Manufacturers (as the 
recognised brands) but also those who make complete products such as machine tools. 
NB: the number of employees is estimated as the mid-point of a range, so the true turnover per employee can be 
substantially higher or lower than that given. For example, in one case, a business has a turnover of £40,000 and reports 1-
10 employees. Since the mid-point of that is 5 employees, turnover per employee is calculated at £8000, which is 
implausibly low. However, if that business in fact only employs one person then the true turnover per employee is a much 
more reasonable £40k. 
A further examination of the workforce revealed a high dependency on EU workers across the 
transport manufacturing sector. On average, 31% of the total manufacturing workforce accounted 
for by the survey (just over 60,000 people) was from the EU. However, this varied substantially by 
firm (and firm size), ranging from 32% for the very largest firms (500+ employees); 36% for large 
firms (251-500); 13% for medium firms (51-250), and 8% for small firms (fewer than 50 employees). 
Evident from some firms within the sample was what might be called an excessive reliance on EU 
workers, with one respondent reporting that over 80% of their workforce were from the EU. This 
one indicator of Brexit exposure reveals the fragility of the business model pursued by firms in the 
sector, explored further in the material that follows.  
Findings 
 
In this section, we explore the supply chain by examining supplier average revenue/turnover 
dependence on a given Vehicle Manufacturer for automotive sector respondents; transport mode 
dependency for manufacturers’ trade (imports and exports with the rest of the EU) and consequent 
Brexit exposure for respondents in the themes highlighted previously. In considering the material in 
this sector, the dominance of one vehicle manufacturer (JLR), with its £25bn turnover and 20,000+ 
workforce in the Midlands should be borne in mind. 
Revenue and purchasing by Vehicle Manufacturers in the West Midlands and wider UK 
AutoAnalysis has developed a property set of information on purchasing policy and spend values at 
the European vehicle manufacturers, especially in the UK.  This data has come from a variety of 
public sources (annual reports and company presentations) and from confidential interviews and 
consulting assignments. This detailed data is not for public dissemination, although the overall totals 
and percentages which can be calculated are highlighted here. This data has been used to underpin 
the AutoAnalysis Brexit Impact Assessment model, which is described in the book, Keeping the 
Wheels on the Road; it has also been in used to underpin calculations cited in public statements by 
the SMMT . 
In a typical year, certainly pre-Brexit, the UK vehicle manufacturers spend in the region of £29bn on 
externally sourced components.  Clearly the actual number varies according to production volumes 
and the mix of vehicles made.  An increase of, say, 5,000 JLR vehicles will boost the spend on 
components far more than would be lost by, for example, a decrease of 5,000 in the number of 
cheaper Astras made.  The spend per Astra would be less than half that of the spend per JLR model.   
Furthermore, each vehicle company varies in terms of the percentage spend at UK-based tier 1s and 
in turn the varying levels of spend by the tier 1s at UK or non-UK tier 2s. 
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The UK spend at the tier 1s by vehicle companies varies between 25% and 50%, while the non-UK 
element of this spend in turn varies by vehicle company from 45% to 65%.  By adjusting the spend 
figures for each vehicle by their UK tier 1 spending and the tier 1s own spend in the UK, the total of 
£29bn typical annual spend is reduced significantly. 
The net result is that around £12bn, or 41%, of the £29bn annual spend, takes place with UK tier 1s.  
Stripping out the non-UK spend by these same tier 1s (they are spending money on sub-components 
on behalf of the vehicle companies) means that their net spend in the UK is around £6.9bn; this 
means that around 24% of the total spend effectively stays within the UK economy. 
Based on our knowledge of the vehicle companies’ principal suppliers and the overall sourcing 
patterns and policies at the UK vehicle manufacturers, we can next calculate how much of each 
vehicle manufacturer’s net spend is in the WMCA (3 LEP) area specifically and the rest of the 
Midlands, including the East Midlands.  UK vehicle companies’ net spend ratio in the WMCA varies 
from 15% to 60% and for the rest of the Midlands area, it varies from a very small level, around just 
2% to 35%.  Applying the appropriate percentages to each vehicle company’s spend value allows us 
to calculate that the typical annual net spend in the WMCA is just over £3.3bn, with a further £940m 
in the rest of the Midlands,  
In turn this means that the WMCA area accounts for nearly 11.5% (£3.3bn divided by £29bn) of total 
spend by the UK vehicle manufacturers; but when adjusted to focus on the net spend (ie once the 
spend with overseas tier 1s is factored in), vehicle companies’ spend in the WMCA area comes to 
represent almost 48% of the net spend in the UK (£3.3bn divided by £6.9bn).  For the rest of the 
Midlands, the ratios are, respectively c3.3% and c13.5%, or for the entire Midlands area, close to 
15% of total spend and just over 61% of net spend. 
Clearly, therefore, whether we are speaking of the WMCA specifically or the broader Midlands area, 
there is a significant level of expenditure by the vehicle companies in the area.  Their contribution to 
the local or regional economy is well-known and the figures shown further demonstrate their 
significance.  Moreover, JLR is, unsurprisingly, the key element in these figures.  We calculate that 
JLR accounts for almost 60% of the net spend in the WMCA area and nearly 53% in the rest of the 
Midlands, or 58% of the overall Midlands area spend.  Nissan is second, accounting for nearly 22% of 
WMCA area spend, versus 21.5% for the Midlands as a whole. 
With around 80% of the spend in the WMCA area accounted for by JLR and Nissan, what happens to 
these two companies is clearly of direct relevance to the WMCA in particular and the Midlands as a 
whole.  By contrast, Mini, Honda and Toyota each account for between 3.5% and nearly 6% of 
WMCA spend; when the total Midlands area is factored in, Toyota become the most important of 
these three, largely because its use of suppliers located close to its factory for just-in-time and 
sequenced deliveries.   The two Vauxhall plants (the car plant in Ellesmere Port and the van plant in 
Luton) have very low UK sourcing overall and limited sourcing within the WMCA or broader 
Midlands area; and as the new van is now a PSA-based vehicle, Vauxhall’s UK sourcing is declining.  
Although significant for the UK’s vehicle manufacturing sector overall, the potential loss of the 
Ellesmere Port production would have a minuscule impact on the WMCA economy.  
The loss of Honda, from sometime in 2021, will take between £125m of spending out of the WMCA 
area economy and another £40m or so from the rest of the Midlands economy.  While this will be 
unwelcome for sure, a 10% decline in JLR volumes, or a 20% fall in Nissan volumes will have a far 
greater impact in terms of their spend in the WMCA area. Understanding what is happening at JLR 
and Nissan especially is clearly critical to how WMCA develops its post-Brexit strategy.  Although 
factory closures in the region may seem unlikely just now, they are possible.  However, what is more 
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than likely now is a continued decline in production volumes at JLR and Nissan, as model cycles, 
market conditions, and Brexit begin the take their toll.  The spend figures cited here will decline in a 
fairly direct relationship with any fall in vehicle production, with a direct impact moreover on the 
level of economic activity in the region. Developing appropriate responses to likely further declines 
in vehicle production, and therefore declining spend by the vehicle companies in the region, will be 
central to the WMCA’s work over the next year or so. 
Vehicle companies have different levels in terms of risk to their UK manufacturing operations in the 
Brexit environment.  Honda, for example, is a 100% certain risk as it has already announced closure 
of its Swindon plant in the UK, due in 2021 and therefore will have clear effects on its suppliers. Ford 
engine production at Bridgend is also ceasing. Vauxhall can be considered as at high risk given recent 
pronouncements by Peugeot, whilst Toyota, Nissan and Mini could be considered as medium risk 
given current developments. 
Moreover, we cannot be certain how the closure of any one plant would impact on individual 
suppliers.  A measure of suppliers’ exposure is the percentage of a supplier’s business generated 
from a particular OEM. A standard accepted measure of exposure is when a particular customer 
accounts for at least 20 percent of a supplier’s revenue, which is a measure accepted across widely-
read business texts.42  Evidence for this from our survey is depicted in Figure 7 below.  
 
Figure 7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Not surprisingly, Figure 7 demonstrates the expected pattern of high exposure to firms with a 
substantial UK-based manufacturing presence (note, firms can be “exposed” to more than one 
                                                          
42 For example, see: https://www.dummies.com/business/corporate-finance/mergers-and-acquisitions/ma-
offering-document-recurring-revenue-and-customer-concentration/   
https://www.eulerhermes.com/en_US/resources-and-insights/economic-insights/avoid-high-customer-
concentration.html  
https://www.msn.com/en-sg/money/news/what-you-need-to-know-about-customer-concentration-risk/ar-
BBVmlNk  
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OEM), and particularly acute exposure to those with manufacturing plants in the region (namely, JLR 
and Toyota).  
The predominance of JLR is further underscored by this analysis and reiterates the vital importance 
of this vehicle manufacturer to the continued viability of the automotive manufacturing sector in the 
West Midlands. Indeed, such is the volume of value-added that JLR undertake in the Region (in 
contrast to other Vehicle Manufacturers) that it should be considered as a ‘strategic asset’ for the UK 
– which we will come back to in terms of policy prescriptions to mitigate the impact of a hard Brexit. 
The concentration of automotive GVA in the West Midlands is apparent in Figure 8 below, which 
only reiterates the importance of JLR as a “jewel in the crown” for UK manufacturing. 
 
Figure 8 
 
  
 
Of course, JLR have significant investment (and hence sunk costs) that will likely see it having to 
continue to hold substantive manufacturing operations in the West Midlands in the event of a hard 
Brexit (in the short-term at least). However, the costs of a hard Brexit (particularly the default no-
deal scenario at the end of 2020) would be considerable for the firm (of the order of £1.2bn a year 
for the firm). This would be unsustainable with current UK operations. This reiterates the need for 
both supply chain diversification and support for JLR’s domestic operations (a theme taken up 
further in the policy section later). Next, we turn to examining the nature of importing and exporting 
to other EU states, in order to ascertain the nature of Brexit “exposure”. Following this, we then 
offer an analysis of the nature of jobs exposure for the sector. 
 
Importing from and exporting to the EU: transport mode dependency for manufacturers’ trade 
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The EU is the UK’s largest trading partner and this is even more pertinent for the transport 
manufacturing sector, with supply chains embedded deep into EU countries (especially Germany). In 
terms of our manufacturers, a large majority (127 firms) import from the EU. In contrast, only 16 
stated that they did not (a further 3 did not answer the question). Almost all (93%) of the larger 
manufacturers imported from the EU, whilst 89% of medium-sized firms imported from the EU. In 
contrast, only 67% of small manufacturers did so. The findings were very similar for exporters (92% 
of larger manufacturers, 85% of medium ones but only 60% of smaller ones). 
In terms of the mode of transport used to import and export products or components, 
approximately half of the survey respondents (52%) imported components via rail. This figure was 
somewhat higher for freight/logistics firms involved in the auto/aero/rail manufacturing sectors (at 
63%) and lower for manufacturers (45%). Of those manufacturers that imported and manufacturers 
that exported, the figures (in terms of the size of firms by employee numbers) are disaggregated as 
follows in Table 5 below. 
 
Table 5 
 
 Firm Size 
Import 
Type 
Small 
(<50) 
Medium 
(51-250) 
Large 
(250+) 
Rail 67% 64% 43% 
Sea 56% 51% 76% 
Air 33% 33% 61% 
 
 Firm Size 
Export 
Type 
Small 
(<50) 
Medium 
(51-250) 
Large 
(250+) 
Rail 71% 58% 45% 
Sea 43% 44% 73% 
Air 14% 44% 54% 
 
 
In considering the mode of transport used to move freight to and from the EU to the UK, only freight 
shipped by air is likely to be unaffected by Brexit. For all firms and particularly for SMEs, heavy 
dependence on the Channel Tunnel rail link is of particular concern as its combination of speed and 
cost is unlikely to be replicable via any other source. These firms are likely to be highly vulnerable. In 
contrast to the prevailing media narrative, product shipped by sea is somewhat less vulnerable in 
many cases, being more cost sensitive (and commensurately less time sensitive). In contrast, 
perhaps, to expectations, only 20% of all exporting firms used Dover at all and only 2.4% used it 
exclusively. For importers, the figures were broadly similar (at 23% and 3.8% respectively). For 
manufacturers, these figures are similar at 16.5% for exporters and 23% for importers.  
As such, the analysis suggests that for companies in the sample, the continental rail link is vastly 
more important for just-in-time components than the Dover-Calais ferry service. The number of 
manufacturers using a given port in the sample is reproduced in Figure 9. What is likely to occur in 
the event of a hard Brexit, however, is rerouting of freight traffic through alternative ports. In this 
sense, Felixstowe/Harwich (depending on whether Ro-Ro or Lo-Lo traffic is required) and 
Southampton are likely to prove key ports, with the A14 and A34/M3 trunk roads likely to provide 
several “pinch points”. In a similar fashion, the analysis strongly suggests that issues might also arise 
on freight rail links. Amongst the sample, the ports of Felixstowe (57 firms), Southampton (56 firms) 
and Liverpool (73 firms) were (at the time of writing) already used by more firms than the port of 
Dover (49 firms).  
 
 
Figure 9 
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In terms of the likely impact of a hard Brexit, this is most likely to be felt on the EU side of the 
“border”, as the UK Government would retain considerable control over what tariff and checking 
regime it would apply to imported parts and components coming from EU countries into the UK. 
However, it would have no control over what happens in other EU countries. In this context the, the 
relevant block is at Calais. If an EU checking regime were to lead to hold-ups here, it seems probable 
that either a major French port with more capacity (potentially Dunkirk or Le Havre) or Rotterdam 
could be used as cross-Channel alternatives. 
On the UK side, to reiterate, this would put high pressure on road links to and from Southampton, 
Immingham/Grimsby and Felixstowe, with the implication being that the A34/M3, A14 and M1/M18 
trunk roads could potentially see significant additional traffic. As such, in the next section, the 
analysis explores respondents’ Brexit exposure and mitigating actions. 
Brexit exposure 
The nature of exposure to a hard Brexit and consequent mitigating actions by firms suggested that 
some progress had been made in this regard. For example, 44% of firms have developed alternative 
logistics arrangements. There were no significant differences between large firms and smaller ones. 
Approximately half of all manufacturers had developed new customs practices and procedures. 
Once again, there was no difference between larger and smaller firms. 
Turning to HR-related issues, there were modest differences between larger and smaller 
manufacturers in terms of the rules and regulations relating to their workforce in the EU. Some 51% 
of larger manufacturers know precisely what the rules are for their staff compared with 57% of 
smaller manufacturers. This difference is very modest in practical terms. The figures are similar for 
freight and logistics firms at 54%. Only 44% of manufacturers are fully ready to remain compliant 
with EU regulations post-Brexit. There was no significant difference between larger and smaller 
firms, although far more freight firms (55%) were confident that they knew what needed to be done 
in order to remain compliant. 
With regards to VAT compliance, there was a distinction between larger and smaller firms. Whilst 
55% of larger manufacturers had fully established VAT compliance, only 46% of smaller 
manufacturers had. This is likely to be a considerable concern for smaller firms in the event of a hard 
Brexit. Just under half of all manufacturers were fully ready in terms of insurance, whereas over half 
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of all freight & logistics firms were. In most of the other areas, freight and logistics firms were ready 
by definition. 
In contrast, only a modest number of firms had fully prepared for the impact of Brexit on their 
suppliers. In particular, just 36% of manufacturers had fully prepared in this regard and there were 
no significant differences between larger and smaller manufacturers. The overwhelming majority of 
firms (89%) had stockpiled and have proactively informed employees about the settled status 
scheme. Of greater concern was the fact that only 24% had completed detailed and accurate 
activities around commodity code and product classification. Similarly, only 16% of respondents felt 
that their organisation was completely prepared with the necessary skills to complete new customs 
requirements related to trade with the EU. A large majority felt that they were at medium risk (70%), 
with the remainder of firms highly exposed on this front. 
Finally, in considering actions to mitigate the potential impact of Brexit, respondents were asked 
what policy actions from government would be helpful. The analysis identified that the “most 
helpful” activities that could be undertaken by government (whether local, regional or national) 
were further investment in regional and national transport infrastructure needed, direct business 
funding to cover the cost of Brexit and further information regarding precise procedures related to 
importing and exporting. Tackling skills gaps (primarily via funding for staff training) was also felt to 
be an imperative. In addition, some respondents felt that the business tax regime could be adjusted 
to help alleviate the expected negative impact of Brexit. As such, in the next section, the implications 
of the analysis for manufacturers and policymakers are considered further.  
Policy considerations for the WMCA and UK Government 
 
The findings of our analysis have highlighted questions of disparity in Brexit readiness levels amongst 
the OEMs and suppliers who participated in this survey. At one end of the spectrum were companies 
with no or minimum understanding of readiness to Brexit, whilst on the other are companies that 
have thought through and may even be prepared to mitigate the impact of Brexit. In the discussion 
that follows, we focus on automotive and aerospace (rail is a far less significant presence in the 
Region and concerns here are similar to the automotive sector). 
WMCA’s policy options for the automotive manufacturing sector will constrained or enabled by 
central government policy and the degree to which permitted intervention is delegated or devolved 
from Westminster to the regions.   Based on the experience of the automotive support policies 
adopted in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, it is likely that significant policy actions for the 
automotive industry post-Brexit, especially in a hard Brexit, will be directed and controlled from 
London, if government decides to support the industry; that said, regional bodies such as WMCA 
need to understand what the potential automotive policy options are and decide on its own 
priorities for lobbying national government to implement and understand where it can take 
unilateral action. 
This section starts with a review of the key broad policy actions for the automotive sector which 
governments took in response to the global financial crisis (the most recent economic shock and 
best recent guide as to how policy could be developed post-Brexit) and the challenge which these 
policies pose vis-à-vis state aid rules, whether under EU or WTO rules; this is followed by 
consideration of which policies, or modifications thereof, the UK government might consider, 
especially in the event of a hard/”no deal” Brexit; consideration of which policy options WMCA 
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should consider, for action either alone or in association with other regional agencies; and finally 
particular measures for aerospace. 
Historic policy actions for automotive in response to economic shocks  
The impact of an economic downturn is often quickly seen in vehicle manufacturing which is often 
seen as a bellwether for the economy as a whole.  This was the case in the major manufacturing 
economies in aftermath of the global financial crisis and subsequent recession. 
The 2008 crash affected the global economy and was caused by the failure of the global financial 
system.  By contrast, the negative impact of Brexit will be primarily felt in the UK, although parts of 
Europe will also be hit if tariffs are imposed and border disruption impacts the finely tuned just-in-
time delivery systems which underpin the many sectors, not just automotive.  Whereas it is possible 
to see the global financial crisis as an external or exogenous event, the economic costs of Brexit will 
likely be seen as self-inflicted, internally generated by the UK; this is potentially significant in terms 
of both developing policy responses in the UK and the potential reaction to such policies when 
viewed from abroad, especially in Brussels. 
In 2008-09, governments across the world took a variety of actions to stimulate their economies, 
some specifically designed to boost car demand and keep factory lights on; many actions actually ran 
counter to the provisions and accepted conventions of WTO and/or EU rules on state aid. However, 
because almost every major government adopted one or more of these policies, there were no 
objections to these policies lodged with either the WTO appeals court nor at or by the authorities in 
Brussels. 
By contrast, were the UK government to adopt some or all of the policies adopted elsewhere in 2008 
in the event of Brexit-induced economic dislocation, it is highly likely in our view that objections will 
be raised, or actions taken in response.  Moreover, despite the current uncertainty over the future 
of the WTO and its appellate court, the EU or individual countries outside the EU could take 
unilateral action against the UK if they felt UK policy actions were unlawful or harmed their own 
interests.  Because the UK will be looking for trade deals with countries or regions outside the EU – 
as well as with the EU – the UK government will need to carefully assess the risk that any aid it gives 
to the automotive industry could be seen as illegal state aid, thereby hampering the UK’s ability to 
strike trade deals; it will also fear triggering reactions against UK exports especially – for example 
counter-vailing duties, or anti-subsidy measures, such as increased tariffs or the imposition of quotas 
on UK exports. 
Nevertheless, even with these risks in mind, the UK government should be considering some or all of 
the following actions43 (this is not intended to be an exhaustive list but indicative of what we think 
are the most likely to be considered): 
                                                          
43 These policies and their legal status vis-à-vis EU and WTO rules in the light of the 2008 crash are discussed in 
Money for the Auto Industry: Consistent with WTO Rules? by Claire Brunel and Gary Clyde Hufbauer available 
at https://www.piie.com/sites/default/files/publications/pb/pb09-4.pdf and Shifting Gears: Industry Policy 
and Automotive Industry after the 2008 Financial Crisis, by Seung-Youn Oh available at 
http://repository.brynmawr.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1028&context=polisci_pubs – it is clear that 
many of the policies adopted post 2008 were technically in breach of WTO and other state aid rules but these 
breaches were not challenged. 
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 Refund of tariffs levied on UK exports to (for example) the EU – in South Africa a very 
complex system exists to eliminate the tariff impact on exports of vehicle produced there.44 
 Writing-off of government loans, if made (as the US did in 2008 with GM and Chrysler). 
 Preferential loans, commitment to covering operating losses for a specific period (again as 
done in the US in 2008). 
 Short-time working support – something which the German government is considering 
implementing now, having done so back in 2008 as well.45  Several other countries also 
followed this route and helped vehicle companies and their suppliers with support for wages 
of workers on short time working.46  
 Bailouts to prevent financial collapse, along the lines of the support given to Chrysler and 
GM by the US government in 2008-09. 
 Taking equity stakes in manufacturers (eg the French government took a stake in PSA when 
it was in financial trouble, alongside its existing stake in Renault); this may be difficult in the 
UK given the overseas ownership of all major vehicle producers. 
 Scrappage schemes to boost demand – these were seen as successful in terms of boosting 
short term demand in the aftermath of the 2008-09 crash, keeping factories busy, but over 
the longer term simply brought forward demand, leading to reduced sales in the future.47 
 Regional investment support schemes – this could in the form of an extended or wider RGF 
with preference given to companies which also committed to the use of domestic suppliers.  
The French government adopted a policy along these lines in the aftermath of the 2008 
crash giving preference to vehicle companies who used French suppliers, despite it being 
non-compliant with WTO rules.  Similarly, the US government had a policy to buy trucks and 
commercial vehicles from any truck manufacturer, so long as the vehicles used US-made 
engines, a policy which was clearly designed to support domestic manufacturers, but which 
was also not WTO-compliant.  That said, in neither case was any objection lodged. 
Potential national policy actions for UK automotive 
Work undertaken by AutoAnalysis in 2019 suggests that many of the policy actions referred to above 
were being actively considered by relevant government departments prior to the general election in 
2019; whether they are still being considered is not known.  
                                                          
44 The scheme and other aspects of the South African government’s automotive industry strategy is explained 
here: https://www.engineeringnews.co.za/print-version/new-look-apdp-could-change-face-of-the-local-auto-
industry-says-naacam-2019-02-01 - it is possible that this scheme would be found non-compliant if challenged 
but the EU has accepted the scheme because of its policy of helping developing or emerging economies grow.  
45 https://europe.autonews.com/automakers/germany-plans-aid-struggling-auto-industry, January 16, 2020 
46 https://www.theguardian.com/business/2009/apr/16/european-short-time-working-unemployment  
47 https://www.smmt.co.uk/2009/10/the-uk-scrappage-incentive-scheme-the-facts/ - this provides an 
indication of the short term impact, boosting output in 2009 by the UK plants of Nissan and Honda especially; 
this report – https://www.ft.com/content/49ea03b6-988f-11de-807a-00144feabdc0 – highlighted the short 
term nature of the scrappage scheme in Germany in terms of boosting manufacturing. 
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However, there are signs that Prime Minister Boris Johnson is willing to be interventionist. The Prime 
Minister indicated his support for the idea of state aid during the general election campaign48 
although there may be limits as to how far this would actually go.  It may be, contrary to 
expectations, that the current government will offer wider practical support to UK industry, making 
greater intervention in certain industries than might have been expected.  For example, during the 
election campaign Johnson told workers in the north-east of England that Nissan would be 
supported, post-Brexit49: what form this support might turn out to be, or indeed whether the 
Government follows through on an election campaign “promises”, remain to be seen.  That said, 
political commentators believe that the government will need to be seen to support key sectors or 
companies in regions where it has won seats if it is to retain them in the long term.50  And moreover, 
it will need to implement such policies early on this parliament for their effect to be seen. 
Given the importance of the automotive manufacturing sector in the West Midlands – and the 
number of seats which it has won there in or near automotive-strong constituencies – it is 
reasonable to expect the new government’s policy to reflect the pressure to maintain existing 
automotive operations if the nature of the Brexit deal from January 1, 2021 undermines the existing 
operating model for the industry.  Disruption to the current operating environment for automotive 
manufacturing seems increasingly likely in the light of statements by the Chancellor who told the 
Financial Times that the UK would divert from EU regulations.51  The SMMT quickly warned that such 
a move would cost the industry “billions”; quite what the government has in mind for the new 
regulatory environment for the industry remains to be seen – but while this is developed it seems 
likely that the investment climate for the industry will worsen while its cost base with mushroom.52 
The previous Conservative administration had an industrial policy with some automotive content.53   
This centred on “sector deals” which feature targeted investment or support for new and emerging 
automotive technologies, e.g., through the Advanced Propulsion Centre, R&D funding for low 
emission technologies, the Faraday Battery Challenge and funds for plug-in hybrid systems and 
developing the electric vehicle charging infrastructure.  To date this strategy has seen more than 
£1bn committed to the sector. 
However, with its focus on R&D and new technologies, the strategy’s support for the industry in the 
automotive sector deal does NOT cover specific companies or even regions; crucially the automotive 
sector deal is NOT concerned with support for existing manufacturing operations and it is these 
operations which would most likely need support in the event of economic dislocation following a 
hard Brexit with the UK switching to trading on WTO terms from January 1st 2021. 
A hard Brexit and operating on WTO terms will mean tariffs on UK-made vehicles exported to the EU 
especially.  A 10% tariff on cars’ landed value in the EU will translate into a 6-7% retail price increase; 
in view of the highly competitive car market, UK manufacturers will either have to cut prices to 
remain price competitive (something which could open manufacturers or the industry as a whole to 
                                                          
48 https://www.ft.com/content/e46f977e-12b5-11ea-a7e6-62bf4f9e548a, November 29, 2019 and 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2019/dec/01/johnson-spots-an-opportunity-over-state-aid-and-it-
may-work, December 1, 2019 
49 https://europe.autonews.com/automakers/nissans-uk-plant-will-be-protected-after-brexit-johnson-says 
50 https://www.theguardian.com/business/2020/jan/12/sajid-javid-must-deliver-a-uk-budget-that-works-
quickly-a-tricky-task, January 12, 2020 
51 https://www.ft.com/content/18ddc610-3940-11ea-a6d3-9a26f8c3cba4, January 18, 2020 
52 https://www.ft.com/content/10ec1b28-39f4-11ea-b232-000f4477fbca, January 19, 2020 
53 https://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-7682 
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accusations of dumping) or see reduced sales in response to tariff-induced price rises; production 
volumes would be hit, with disruption also caused by interruption to just-in-time supply chains.    
The increased costs from tariffs and disruption caused the expected end to seamless just-in-time 
supply systems will have a significant economic impact. Work by AutoAnalysis for SMMT54 shows 
that the UK could lose production of as many as 1.5m vehicles by 2024, at a cost of over £40bn in 
terms of factory gate prices or economic value creation55.  More specifically, as much as 30% of the 
lost volume and 40% of this lost economic value would be in the Midlands area56, with clear 
economic and social consequences for the region. 
Policy actions which the government has in place now focus, as noted above, on future technologies; 
they are of limited relevance to existing operations.  However, unless existing operations are 
supported and retained, there may be few or no viable companies able to profit from the 
government’s strategy for future technologies.  The practical consequence of not providing a 
supportive environment for existing industrial structures while they adjust to a new economic model 
for the country is, in our view, not be fully understood in Westminster.  In this regard, WMCA needs 
to work with the existing automotive industry to persuade central government to provide 
transitional support in one form or another in the event of hard Brexit. 
The challenge will be, as noted above, is that many of the policy actions which industry might like to 
see could fall foul of WTO or state aid terms, even when the UK is outside the EU. However, some 
“good news” in this regard comes from Germany – recent reports suggest that the German 
government is considering reviving help (ie state aid) along the lines of support which it gave to the 
automotive industry in 2008-0957. This would focus initially providing wage subsidies for companies 
which put workers on short time working. Such policies have been adopted on a limited scale in the 
UK in the wake of the GFC via the ProAct scheme in Wales, but they were not adopted on national 
scale in the UK 2008-0958; however, given that it is clearly something which the EU has accepted in 
the past (and is likely to do so again), this is a policy which the UK could quickly adopt to support 
struggling companies. It seems reasonable to expect that the EU would again treat is as compliant 
with state aid rules (or it would have to sanction Germany), even when the UK is outside the EU, we 
believe this measure is something which the WMCA should prepare to lobby government to adopt, 
along with other measures suggested below. 
In addition to encouraging reduced wages support for the industry, the WMCA should, in the event 
of macro-policies being required to help the industry, encourage government to: 
1. Reintroduce a scrappage scheme, with specific support for hybrid or full electric vehicles. 
2. Refocus Regional Growth Fund (RGF) and related support for investment in the EV sector 
especially and boost the Sectoral Deal for automotive. 
                                                          
54 https://www.smmt.co.uk/2019/11/only-ambitious-brexit-deal-will-safeguard-jobs-and-britains-green-
future/ 
55 The data quoted by SMMT was based on a hard Brexit beginning on February 1, 2020 – delaying this to 
January 1, 2021 would simply delay the economic impact but not reduce it. 
56 Based on the AutoAnalysis Brexit Impact Assessment model – see Chapter 3 in Keeping the Wheels on the 
Road 
57 https://europe.autonews.com/automakers/germany-plans-aid-struggling-auto-industry 
58 Bailey, D and N Berkeley (2014) Regional Responses to Recession: A Case Study of the West Midlands, 
Regional Studies, 48(11), 1797-1812. 
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3. Tariff rebate schemes – this is a very complicated area and the South African scheme 
referred to above (which is effectively an investment related tariff rebate scheme) may not 
be accepted by the EU as appropriate for the UK. 
Potential policy actions for WMCA 
While the majority of policy action options open to support existing manufacturing will depend on 
central government policy and funding, there are some policy actions which local government 
bodies can consider/enact with regard to business, people and place: 
 Potential business tax/rates holidays – business rates are widely seen as a disproportionate 
cost burden borne by UK manufacturing companies especially when comparted to 
equivalent taxes levied in continental Europe. 
 Training funding to help companies retrain and reskill workers for the transition to EV 
production throughout the supply chain. 
 Offer a loan fund for the supply chain. This was used in the case of the Rover Task Force and 
also in the wake of the GFC. 
 Provide diversification support for firms in the industry. This was significant and important in 
both the MG Rover collapse59 and in the wake of the GFC60, in the latter case through the 
Automotive Response Programme. 
 Invest in expanding the on-road/car park EV charging infrastructure – this could be a major 
job creation policy as well as expanding the skill base in electrical workers. 
 Establish an industry support task force. Taskforces were set up around Rover and LDV and 
at region levels in the wake of the GFC. Swindon Borough Council and related bodies set up a 
taskforce in the aftermath of the announcement of the Honda factory closure – that said, 
WMCA needs to be careful that such a task force has a clear remit and resources to see this 
through. 
 Consider local procurement strategies in line with the UK’s obligations under international 
agreements. 
 Establish special enterprise zones with excellent connectivity and a range of tax incentives. 
These should be centred on existing areas of automotive specialisation, building on existing 
clusters of expertise and support the growth of cutting-edge technologies in the region. 
Incubation of scale-up firms is another important area of focus. 
 Look to attract a battery giga-factory to the region to underpin low cost battery production 
in the UK. 
 And look to win the installation of an Arrival CV factory:61 Hyundai and Kia have recently 
announced a £100m investment in this new UK EV van company.  The company claims its 
                                                          
59 See: Bailey, D and S MacNeill (2008) The Rover Task Force: A Case Study in Proactive and Reactive Policy 
Intervention? Regional Science Policy and Practice. Vol.1, Iss.1, 2008, 1-16. 
60 Bailey, D and N Berkeley (2014) Regional Responses to Recession: A Case Study of the West Midlands, 
Regional Studies, 48(11), 1797-1812. 
61 https://europe.autonews.com/automakers/hyundai-kia-invest-110-million-uk-electric-van-startup-arrival  
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manufacturing system is based on small volume micro-factories and would therefore seem 
to be a potentially quick win for new investment. 
Considerations for Aerospace 
Moving forwards, it is clear that the details of the UK’s future partnership with the EU will be crucial. 
Tariffs are less significant than for other sectors as international agreements mean that components 
and final products do not attract tariffs. Three issues then are of much greater concern.  Specifically: 
 Potential frictions and delays, particularly in transport 
 Skills shortages, particularly given the challenges raised in relation to a substantial EU 
workforce. 
 Possible regulatory barriers – the sector is keen to ensure that the UK remains under the 
aegis of the European Aviation Safety Agency. 
The consequences of Brexit for the sector will be far-reaching and therefore regional government 
will want to work with central government to ensure that certain key objectives are met. In common 
with other transport manufacturing industries (notably automotive), avoiding excessive border 
delays will be key. “[A]ny additional customs procedures resulting even in relatively short delays 
could detract from the UK’s industry’s ability to compete for work and investment”62. 
Once again, there are important ramifications in terms of the UK’s domestic transport architecture, 
with the A14, the A34, M3 and M1 likely to come under particular pressure in the event of traffic 
being routed away from the Dover-Calais strait. In the immediate term, the sector needs to ensure 
that movement of key personnel between sites in Europe can continue unfettered. 
In the longer-term, it is highly desirable that the UK’s domestic skills base is enhanced. This will 
mean close cooperation between regional and national government to ensure enhanced provision of 
employment-specific skills for the sector. Such an approach, however, must also recognise that a 
large portion of this potential labour is spatially rooted: there is a crucial need to work between 
actual (and potential) regional employers and trainees. 
In the short term, there is a need for continued easy access to skilled EU labour.  Upskilling the 
workforce will take years and, in order not to lose business in the interim the region will need to 
continue to rely on EU labour.  Due to the value of the industry, there is a vested interest on the part 
of European governments in enabling smooth operation of the broader aerospace supply chain. 
As such, significant efforts will need to be made by both private sector enterprises and governments 
in the UK and EU to avoid supply chain disruption.  In the case of the aerospace sector, a matter of 
considerable urgency that will need addressing in any one of the scenarios envisaged is UK 
membership of EASA. 
Continued membership of EASA is not automatic: it requires action on the part of the UK 
Government.  The UK’s own Civil Aviation Authority does not presently have the capacity to take 
over the current functions of EASA in certification and other areas.  Indeed, it is not even 
undertaking preparatory work at present as taking over the responsibilities of EASA is not considered 
a viable option63. 
Outside of EASA, in the short-term recertification would need to be done by a major agency (in 
practice probably the EASA).  However, the costs associated with doing so would be substantial.  This 
                                                          
62 Business Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee. (2018). The impact of Brexit on the aerospace sector. 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmbeis/380/38002.htm 
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would threaten the medium-term viability of the UK’s aerospace supply chain. There would also be 
immediate, short-term threats to the UK’s position in aircraft servicing and repair given the 
importance of EASA oversight. 
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Appendix 1: Survey questionnaire template 
 
Supply Chain Mapping & Brexit Exposure Survey 
 
   Q1 Please specify which broad sector your company operates in: 
o Agriculture  
o Extractive industry (mining, quarrying, oil etc.) or utilities  
o Manufacturing  
o Construction  
o Wholesale/Retail  
o Freight transport or logistics  
o Passenger transport  
o Accommodation & food  
o ICT (including telecoms)  
o Finance (including insurance)  
o Property  
o Legal/accounting  
o Engineering  
o Business admin & support  
o Arts, entertainment et al.  
o Education  
o Health  
o Other public sector  
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o Other services  
 
    Q2 Which of the following descriptions best matches your role? 
o Executive role (e.g. CEO, CFO, COO)  
o Professional  
o Procurement manager  
o Operations manager  
o Technical  
o Sales  
o Other  
 
     Q3 In which regions of the UK does your company have substantial operations? 
▢   Scotland  
▢   Wales  
▢   Northern Ireland  
▢   North East England  
▢   North West England  
▢   Yorkshire & Humberside  
▢   East Midlands  
▢   West Midlands  
▢    East Anglia  
▢   London  
▢   South East England  
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▢   South West England  
 
Q37 Please select which sectors your company is involved in: 
▢   Automotive manufacture  
▢   Aerospace manufacture  
▢   Rail manufacture  
▢   Other road vehicle manufacture (lorries, buses etc.)  
▢   Manufacture of furniture  
▢   Civil engineering  
▢   Manufacture of food/drink products  
▢   Manufacture of textiles (incl. leather)  
▢   Road transport of goods within the UK  
▢   Other  
 
    Q5 Thinking now about your company's operations in the West Midlands in particular: 
    Q6 In which districts does your company have significant operations? 
▢   Derby  
▢   Derbyshire  
▢   Nottingham  
▢   Nottinghamshire  
▢   Leicester  
▢   Leicestershire/Rutland  
▢   Northamptonshire  
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▢   Lincolnshire  
▢   Herefordshire  
▢   Worcestershire  
▢   Warwickshire  
▢   Telford & Wrekin  
▢   Shropshire  
▢   Stoke-on-Trent  
▢   Staffordshire  
▢   Birmingham  
▢   Solihull  
▢   Coventry  
▢   Dudley  
▢   Sandwell  
▢   Walsall  
▢   Wolverhampton  
 
Q9 Approximately how many people does your company employ? 
▢    Self-employed (no employees)  
▢    1-10  
▢    11-50  
▢    51-250  
▢    251-500  
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▢    500+  
 
Q7 Which specific industrial areas does your company work in? 
▢   Manufacture of motor vehicles  
▢   Freight transport  
▢   Manufacture of bodies (coachwork) for motor vehicles; manufacture of trailers and semitrailers  
▢   Manufacture of parts and accessories for motor vehicles  
▢   Logistics services (including freight forwarding/customs and compliance)  
▢   Manufacture of railway locomotives and rolling stock  
▢   Manufacture of parts and accessories for railways locomotives and rolling stock  
▢   Manufacture of air and spacecraft and related machinery (including parts thereof)  
▢   Manufacture of other transport equipment  
▢   Manufacture of glass and glass products  
▢   Manufacture of non-metallic mineral products  
▢   Manufacture of abrasive products  
▢   Manufacture of steel tubes, pipes, hollow profiles and related products  
▢   Manufacture of other products of first processing of steel  
▢   Manufacture of steel or ferro-alloys  
▢   Manufacture of non-ferrous metals  
▢   Casting of metals  
▢   Forging, pressing, stamping and roll-forming of metal  
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▢   Powder metallurgy  
▢   Treatment and coating of metals  
▢   Machining  
▢   Manufacture of other fabricated metal products  
▢   Manufacture of electronic components  
▢   Manufacture of electric motors, generators, transformers and control apparatus  
▢   Manufacture of metal forming machinery and machine tools  
▢   Manufacture of other special-purpose machinery  
▢   Manufacture of rubber products  
▢   Manufacture of plastic products  
▢   Engineering and technical consultancy  
▢   Other  
 
Q8 Which of the following best applies to your company? 
▢   OEM  
▢   Tier 1 supplier  
▢   Tier 2 supplier  
▢   Tier 3+ supplier  
▢   Industrial service provider  
 
Q10 Approximately what percentage of your company's employees are citizens of an EU27 member state? (The EU27 
comprises Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Republic of Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Spain and Sweden) 
 
Q11 Turnover at parent company or site 
 
Q12 Please select whether this relates to parent company or site 
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o Parent  
o Site  
 
Q13 Please give the approximate percentage of your company's turnover from the following sectors (must total 100%): 
o  _______ Automotive (cars, LCVs, trucks, buses, off-highway) 
o  _______ Aerospace 
o  _______ Rail (track, locomotives, rolling stock, other) 
o  _______ Other 
 
Q16 Thinking specifically about the portion of your company's business related to the automotive sector: 
 
Q15 Of that portion of your business related to the automotive sector, please give the approximate business split by vehicle 
company: 
o Jaguar/Land Rover (JLR) : _______  
o Nissan : _______  
o Mini : _______  
o Toyota : _______  
o Honda : _______  
o Vauxhall : _______  
o Bentley : _______  
o Rolls Royce (cars) : _______  
o Ford (UK) : _______  
o Other UK cars : _______  
o Other UK (trucks, buses etc.) : _______  
o Volkswagen Automotive Group (Volkswagen, Audi, Skoda, Seat, Lamborghini etc) : _______  
o BMW : _______  
o Mercedes-Benz : _______  
o Ford (non-UK operations) : _______  
o Peugeot, Citroen & DS : _______  
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o Volvo : _______  
o Fiat-Chrysler Automotive (Fiat, Jeep, Alfa Romeo, Lancia, Chrysler and Maserati) : _______  
o Other EU car manufacturer : _______  
o EU truck/bus : _______  
o Rest of World : _______  
o Unknown : _______  
o Total : ________  
 
Q18 Does your company import goods from (or via) the EU? 
o Yes  
o No  
 
Q17 Please specify which mode(s) of transport are used when goods enter the UK (tick all that apply)? 
o Rail  
o Sea  
o Air  
o Unknown  
 
Q20 Which port(s) are used? 
 
▢   Dover  
▢   Felixstowe  
▢   Southampton  
▢   Hull  
▢   Liverpool  
▢   Holyhead  
▢   Immingham  
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▢   Portsmouth  
▢   Cardiff/Bristol  
▢   Other  
 
Q21 Which airports are used? 
▢   Birmingham International  
▢   East Midlands  
▢   Heathrow  
▢   Stansted  
▢   Gatwick  
▢   Manchester  
▢   Other  
 
Q19 Does your company export goods to (or via) the EU? 
o Yes  
o No  
 
Q36 Please specify which mode(s) of transport are used when goods leave the UK (tick all that apply)? 
o Rail  
o Sea  
o Air  
o Unknown  
 
Q38 Which port(s) are used? 
▢   Dover  
▢   Felixstowe  
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▢   Southampton  
▢   Hull  
▢   Liverpool  
▢   Holyhead  
▢   Immingham  
▢   Portsmouth  
▢   Cardiff/Bristol  
▢   Other  
 
Q39 Which airports are used? 
▢   Birmingham International  
▢   East Midlands  
▢   Heathrow  
▢   Stansted  
▢   Gatwick  
▢   Manchester  
▢   Other  
 
Q22 Which of the following does your company regularly use to transport goods? 
▢   M6  
▢   M1  
▢   M42  
▢   M40  
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▢   M25  
▢   M20  
▢   A14  
▢   A34  
▢   A41  
▢   A5  
▢   Unknown  
▢   Other trunk road(s) 
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Q23 For each of the following measures, please indicate whether you have started or not, are part way through or are fully 
prepared 
 
 
Q24 To what extent has your organisation prepared for the potential impact on your suppliers? 
▢   Not reviewed supply base  
▢   Partial review of key suppliers  
▢   100% strategically reviewed, risks identified and appropriate measures could be actioned  
▢   Not applicable  
 
Q25 Has your organisation actively increased inventory levels of raw materials or finished products to mitigate risk of disruption 
at ports? 
▢   Yes  
▢   No  
 Not yet started Started but not finished Fully ready Not applicable 
Are your existing 
suppliers able to supply 
you in a seamless 
manner in a no deal 
Brexit?  
o  o  o  o  
Have you developed 
alternative logistics 
solutions, e.g., new 
routes or modes of 
transport?  
o  o  o  o  
Have you developed 
new customs practices 
and procedures?  o  o  o  o  
Do you understand the 
rules regarding your 
staff working in EU, e.g., 
the need for their own 
work permits and 
related passport issues?  
o  o  o  o  
Have you begun work to 
remain compliant with 
EU regulations?  o  o  o  o  
Have you established 
your EU VAT status and 
future VAT compliance?  o  o  o  o  
Have you investigated 
the need for additional 
insurance etc.?  o  o  o  o  
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▢   Not applicable  
 
Q27 Has your organisation developed any contingency plans should there be restrictions on the Free Movement of people? 
▢   No such plans  
▢   Basic plans  
▢   100% detailed planning completed  
▢   Not applicable  
 
Q28 Has your organisation received its EORI identification which will be a prerequisite for international trade into EU markets 
post-Brexit? 
▢   Yes  
▢   No  
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      Q29 Please make any comments on challenges or problems involved  
       in your Brexit preparations 
      Q30 How detailed and accurate have your Brexit activities been around commodity  
      code/product classification cleansing? 
o No plans at present  
o Partial planning complete  
o 100% completed and no risks envisaged  
o Not applicable  
 
Q31 To what extent is your organisation prepared with the necessary skills to be able to complete new customs requirements on 
import and export administration, complete Certificates of Origin, Long Term Supplier Declarations etc.? 
o Exposed  
o Medium risk  
o Risks mitigated  
o Not applicable  
 
Q32 Has your organisation simulated the impact on cash flow resulting from additional cost exposure such as import VAT, duties, 
capital tie-up, overtime for stock-builds, additional warehouse capacity? 
o Yes  
o No  
 
Q33 Has your organisation set up a “Deferment Account” to pay for customs duties, import VAT and excise duties? 
o Yes  
o No  
Q34 In the event of a "no-deal" Brexit, what help (if any) would you like from government (whether local, regional or national)? 
▢   None  
▢   Specific Brexit advice  
▢   Click to write Choice 8  
▢   Further investment in regional transport infrastructure  
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▢   Further investment in national transport infrastructure, including ports  
▢   Direct business funding  
▢   Adjustment to business rates and taxes  
▢   Further information regarding precise procedures  
▢   Funding for staff training to fill general skills gaps  
 
      Q35 Please add any further comments below 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
